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
LIAISON WITH RELIGIOUS PVOs

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of [Joint Military Operations].

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _Mark G. Stein_

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The Joint Task Force Commander will neither command nor control non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and private volunteer organizations [PVOs] during humanitarian assistance operations [HAOs]. While the civil-military operations center [CMOC] is assigned the task of liaison with relief organizations, the present composition of the CMOC lacks the resident capability to communicate and coordinate with religious [PVOs]. The Chaplain Corps and the JTF Chaplain, leveraging the technology of network centric communication, represent the most viable means of facilitating communication and coordination between the Joint Task Force Commander and religious PVOs.

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Abstract of

LIAISON WITH RELIGIOUS PVOs

The Joint Task Force Commander will neither command nor control non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and private volunteer organizations [PVOs] during humanitarian assistance operations [HAOs]. Reliance on communication and coordination between the Joint Task Force and relief organizations are essential to ensure unity of effort and ultimately, mission accomplishment. Communication and coordination are contingent on effective liaison.

The increasing number and diversity of relief organizations, particularly, religious private organizations, underscores the necessity for liaison prior to and during HAOs. While the civil-military operations center [CMOC] is assigned the task of liaison with relief organizations, the present composition of the CMOC lacks the resident capability to communicate and coordinate with religious [PVOs]. Pacifist religious PVOs, in particular, have been reluctant to interact with the military.

Extensive knowledge of religious denominations forms the bedrock of the Chaplain Corps' capability. The Chaplain Corps and the JTF Chaplain, leveraging the technology of network centric communication, represent the most viable means of facilitating communication and coordination between the Joint Task Force Commander and religious PVOs. Joint doctrine must be changed to designate the Chaplain Corps as the principle liaison with religious PVOs prior to operations and the JTF Chaplain, assigned to the CMOC, as the principle liaison with religious PVOs in the theater of operations.

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INTRODUCTION

The military and non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and private volunteer organizations [PVOs] have increased their participation in humanitarian assistance operations [HAOs], disaster relief [DR], and consequence management [CM]. This presents an array of challenges to command and control [C2] for the Joint Force Commander [JTF]. Joint Vision 2010 recognizes that planning to achieve American security objectives, particularly in military operations other than war [MOOTW], must incorporate the depth of experience and expertise provided by NGOs and PVOs.[1] Since the JTF Commander will neither command nor control NGOs and PVOs, the question becomes how best to effectively consult and coordinate with NGOs and PVOs to ensure mission accomplishment. This paper will submit two proposals: the designation of the Chaplain Corps as the principle liaison with religious PVOs prior to humanitarian operations; and the assignment of the JTF Chaplain to the civil-military operation center [CMOC] as the liaison with religious PVOs in the area of operations. The institutional capability of the Chaplain Corps, combined with network centric technology, represents the most efficient and direct means for the Joint Task Force Commander to communicate and coordinate with religious PVOs, prior to and during operations.

OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

Humanitarian operations illustrate the challenges in achieving unity of effort between the military and relief organizations. For example, *Tempest Express 1999*, a consequence management exercise sponsored by Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet, and I Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Force, Pacific, was based upon the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl. Though Religious PVOs, the Russian

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Orthodox Church and the Baptist Union of Byelorussia, supported the victims of Chernobyl through contributions and pastoral care,[2] the CMOC of *Tempest Express 1999* neglected to consider the possibility of religious PVO participation in the *Tempest Express* scenario. Religious PVOs were not incorporated into the exercise. As a result, information regarding the missions and capabilities of religious PVOs were unavailable to the JTF Commander.[3]

Citing lessons learned from humanitarian assistance operations, The Humanitarianism and War Project and The Humanitarian Law Consultancy concluded that, "the relationship of humanitarian organizations with the military proved to be a double-edged sword."[4] The effectiveness of the relationship between the military and NGOs and PVOs focussed on expectations in three functional areas: fostering security, supporting humanitarian work, and providing direct assistance to civilians. Referencing the crisis in Kosovo, civilian aid providers gave the military high marks for their efforts toward generating a climate of security and, with some exceptions, their support for humanitarian work. The cooperative spirit between the military and the NGOs and PVOs diminished when the military extended direct assistance to the civilian population. The military's direct assistance to the civilian population confused the division of labor and generated an adversarial relationship with the civilian aid providers.[5]

[1] Joint Vision 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
[2] Mennonite Central Committee, Christianity and the Environment: A Collection of Writings, "Chernobyl: The Disaster Continues, October 25, 1990, http://www.mcc.org/occasional/13/14.html, 01/06/2000.
[3] Unpublished lessons learned from Tempest Express 1999.
[4] The Humanitarianism and War Project and The Humanitarian Law Consultancy, *The Interaction of NATO-Related Military Forces with Humanitarian Actors in the Kosovo Crisis.* Discussion Note prepared for a Workshop to be convened by the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, The Hague, November 15-16, 1999, 16.71. This source was the result of an interview with Kenlynn Schroeder, Director of Emergencies for Lutheran World Relief.
[5] Ibid.

Effective liaison clarifies divisions of labor, exchanges information regarding capabilities, and ensures unity of effort. In order for liaison to be effective, it must commence prior to operations and be maintained throughout the operations. Coordination that occurs between NGOs and PVOs and the military during the operation is too late. Communicating with relief organizations prior to and during operations can deliver thorough knowledge of the operational area to the JTF Commander. Similarly, the NGOs and PVOs benefit from a more comprehensive orientation to military logistical and security capabilities. The on-going exchange of information fosters an environment that integrates military means with NGO and PVO ends. The CMOC, in its present form, does not have the resident capability to affect sufficient liaison with the numerous and diverse religious PVOs to make unity of effort a reality.[6]

If the goal of C2 is mission accomplishment through unity of effort, then familiarization with relief organizations is a must (i.e., NGO and PVO principles, procedures, expertise, capabilities, structure, their perception of the military and geographical area of interest). Knowledge of diverse NGOs and PVOs must be current to optimize operational planning for the Joint Task Force Commander. Cooperative relationships are built on information exchange. As cooperative relationships develop, mutual understandings are reached.[7] Operational plans based upon accurate information and pre-existing relationships will temper expectations; tempered expectations will foster enhanced communications and coordination. This is the type of relationship envisioned by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili:

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[6] Colonel Guy C. Swan III, USA, *Uneasy Partners: NGOs and the US Military in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies,* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylania: US Army War College, 1996), 29ff.
[7] Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,* Vol. I., 9 October 1996, I-1.

"What's the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGO and PVO that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other."[8]

A NETWORK OF PEOPLE AND NODES

"The growing awareness that both public and private organizations are essential to the success of any humanitarian venture, however, has not yet resulted in improved coordination."[9] The growing number and diversity of NGOs and PVOs require military leadership to consider alternative methods of interacting with relief organizations. No single mode of communication will be effective in reaching all NGOs and PVOs. There is, however, a resource in the military that can effectively interact with religious PVOs.

The oldest staff corps in the United States Navy, the Chaplain Corps, has an extensive knowledge of religious denominations and the relief organizations they sponsor. Understanding denominational complexities forms the bedrock of professional competencies for military chaplains. Furthermore, the Chaplain Corps is accustomed to working with a wide range of beneficent organizations (NGOs and PVOs), both in America and abroad. The Chaplain's non-combatant status, guaranteed by the Geneva Convention of 1949, conveys trust and can be utilized to build bridges even with pacifist relief organizations. The Chaplain Corps has extensive knowledge of religious groups and is an ideal resource for the JTF Commander organizing HAOs.

With the advent of network centric communications, the Chaplain Corps can maintain current information on religious PVOs and forward that information to the JTF

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[8] Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, Virginia, June 16, 1997), II-2.

[9] United States Institute of Peace, *Response to International Conflict Highlights from the Managing Chaos Conference*, "NGOs and Conflict Management," Pamela R. Aall, 1996, 12.

Commander.[10] Many religious PVOs have Internet Wed Sites that describe their

denominational structure, doctrinal positions, and benevolent activities.[11] For example,

the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod's relief organization, Lutheran World Relief,[12] has

a Web Site that recounts the most recent Lutheran Disaster Response efforts in Taiwan,

Turkey, and Kosovo.[13]

On the relational level, the Chaplain Corps' existing contacts with those

organizations would be formalized to exchange procedural information. That

information, distilled into operational plans, cultivates unity of effort during real world

operations.[14] The Chaplain Corps could sponsor disaster relief symposiums and invite

religious PVOs to exchange lessons learned. Network centric communication facilitates

the efficient exchange of information and the coalescing of partnerships. Those growing

partnerships allow the Joint Task Force Commander to anticipate potential NGO and

PVO participation, thereby, working toward synchronization in time, space, and

purpose.[15]

At the Joint Task Force level, the JTF Chaplain would be assigned to the civil-

military operations center [CMOC] and tasked with monitoring the religious PVOs

participating in that particular relief operation. The current schematic for the CMOC

does not include the Chaplain as a member of the CMOC.[16] Referring to *Tempest

Express 1999*, no provision was made to include the JTF Chaplain in operational

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[10] The Navy Chaplain Corps has a centralized information entity called the Chaplain Resource Board and intensified its cooperative ventures with the Army and Air Force Chaplain Corps.

[11] *Indigenous Religions Resources*, http://160.150.55.11/Library2/IndigReligMenu.htm, 12/19/99.

[12] Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. II, Annex P to Appendix B.

[13] Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, Lutheran World Relief, http://worldrelief.lcms.org/WRMAIN.HTML, 11/24/1999.

[14] Ibid. Direct contact with the organizational director was made via the Internet and facilitated the Internet contact with the Humanitarianism and War Project and the Humanitarian Law Consultancy.

[15] Joint Pub 3-08, I-3.

planning until the JTF Chaplain recommended that he be assigned to the CMOC. That recommendation was approved and the Chaplain's input enabled the CMOC to anticipate the participation of NGOs and PVOs. The Officer in Charge of the CMOC stated that, "prior to Chaplain representation in the CMOC, operational planning took place in a vacuum and did not include the critical role of NGOs and religious PVOs."[17]

The Chaplain Corps, using the components of Network Centric Warfare (viz., information superiority, shared awareness, adaptability, speed of command, and self-synchronization),[18] can communicate and coordinate with religious PVOs prior to relief operations. The JTF Chaplain, as member of the CMOC, can monitor religious PVO involvement during relief operations--a network of people and nodes. Religious PVOs have grown in number, influence, and involvement in humanitarian endeavors. Some religious PVOs work individually while others consolidate their efforts and represent a group of denominations united in benevolence.[19] An awareness of the unique theological perspectives constitutes an essential element in the process of communication with religious PVOs.

THE COMPLEXITY AND DIVERSITY OF RELIGIOUS PVOs

The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the free exercise of religion, hence, Title 10 of the United States Code stipulates that chaplains accompany US forces

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[16] Joint Pub 3-08, III-16ff.

[17] Unpublished lessons learned from Tempest Express 1999. The consequence management scenario, with its setting in Russia, clearly invited the participation of Orthodox Christian, Lutheran, Catholic, and Islamic relief organizations.

[18] Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, "Network Centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age," a presentation at the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.

[19] *The Washington Papers,* "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies," Andrew S. Natsios (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 64ff.

to facilitate that free exercise of religion.[20] There are hundreds of religious groups in America, all adhering to distinctive doctrines, traditions, and practices. Religious doctrines, traditions, and practices have an impact on the conduct of humanitarian operations. Doctrine determines how various religious denominations perceive the military and whether they will interact with the military. Some religious PVOs will find cooperative efforts with the military mutually rewarding. The goal of liaison with religious PVOs is to establish common ground that will provide information to operational planners on security requirements, area of operations, and specialized expertise.

Some religious PVOs are pacifists and interpret contact with the military as incompatible with their operations. For example, the North American Mennonite and Brethren in Christ Church is a pacifist denomination. The Mennonite relief organization, the Mennonite Central Committee [MCC], was founded in 1920. The MCC has 800 workers in 58 countries around the world to help people "suffering from poverty, conflict, oppression and natural disaster."[21] MCC's opposition to the military was reinforced when the MCC supported the Innu of Labrador in an attempt to stop NATO low-level training flights over Labrador.[22] It follows then, that communication with such groups will be tenuous at best, even if initiated by the Chaplain Corps. Yet, overtures to such groups enhance C2 if pursued within the context of the greater good, namely, reaching an understanding while maintaining independent operations.[23]

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[20] Joint Pub 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations,* 26 August 1996, I-1.
[21] Mennonite Central Committee, http://www.mcc.org/index.html, 01/06/2000.
[22] Ibid., *News Service,* "Deal to double military flights in Labrador leaves Innu angry and frustrated," 21 March 1996, http://www.mcc.org/pr/1996/03-21/3.html, 01/06/2000.
[23] Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. I, II-18.

Other religious groups, though kindly disposed to the military, interpret direct associations with the military in the area of operations as inherently hazardous to their volunteers or likely to jeopardize their standing with the very people they are attempting to assist. The abduction of Christian missionaries in Rwanda in July of 1998 provides ample justification for such concern.[24] Prior coordination will enable the Joint Task Force Commander to anticipate religious PVO presence in volatile areas of operations, thus enabling provisions to be made for their safety without compromising their standing among the indigenous people.[25]

The military and religious PVOs thrive from close relationships. Religious PVOs have extensive experience in certain regions and prove to be valuable sources of information for the military. By providing security, the military can empower religious PVOs to focus their energy on humanitarian assistance. The principles for Joint Operations Other Than War can guide the military in reaching common ground with religious PVOs (See Appendix).[26] Familiarity with core capabilities between the military and religious PVOs assists all participants in attaining their respective goals. Mutual coordination transforms ambiguous objectives to clearly defined, attainable objectives.[27]

THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF COORDINATION

The discussion, thus far, has focussed on the validity of combining network centric technology with the institutional capability of the Chaplain Corps. The Chaplain Corps would be designated as the principal liaison with religious PVOs prior to operations; and the Joint Task Force Chaplain would be assigned to the CMOC as the

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[24] *World News: Inter Press Service,* "Religion-Rwanda: Rebels Target Missionaries," http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/jul98/14_05_057.html, 1/8/00.
[25] Ibid., II-19.
[26] Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* 1 February 1995, V-2ff.

principal liaison with religious PVOs in the area of operations. Building the case for this proposal hinges upon a critical analysis of the potential risks: loss of security, loss of the chaplain's non-combatant status, loss of time and resources, and loss of command and control.

Some would argue that it is not possible to engage religious PVOs without compromising operational security. Using network centric technology to engage religious PVOs increases the risk to operational security. Opponents of engaging religious PVOs could assert that the risk to operational security is enough to prohibit collaboration between religious PVOs and the military. Information Age Warfare and religious PVOs opposed to the military add credence to the argument against liaison. How does the military maintain operational security (i.e., never permitting hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage)[28] while fostering unity of effort with relief organizations?

Security, by definition, is a dynamic principle of Joint Operations to ensure force protection.[29] Prohibiting the exchange of information with religious PVOs due to operational security denies the Joint Task Force Commander critical information on the operational area.[30] There is a course of action that would maintain operational security and facilitate interaction with relief organizations. Traditional safeguards (i.e., confining the discussion of operations to the "need to know" elements essential to unity of effort)

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[27] Joint Pub 3-08, Vol. I., III-1.
[28] Joint Pub 3-0, V-2.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Stephen Green, *International Disaster Relief* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

combined with ongoing network centric security measures maintain security without inhibiting information exchange.[31]

Does the Chaplain Corps, serving as the principle liaison for the military with religious PVOs, compromise the non-combatant status of the chaplain? Serving as a liaison means that the chaplain will forward information from religious PVOs to operational planners. Some could argue that the JTF Chaplain's non-combatant status is jeopardized the moment he becomes involved with operational planning?

The chaplain's non-combatant status is not compromised through coordination with relief organizations. On the contrary, as adviser to the Commanding Officer on religious matters, the chaplain is performing a function appropriate to his vocation. The chaplain's non-combatant status is non-threatening to religious PVOs and becomes an asset to operational planners. For example, the Chaplain Corps can sponsor HAO symposiums exchanging information and searching for common ground with religious PVOs of pacifist traditions. The JTF Chaplain will use the information gathered at the higher echelon to initiate communications with relief organizations in the area of operations. The relationship building at both levels may bolster operational security by providing the Joint Task Force Commander with time critical information to respond to imminent danger (e.g., executing a noncombatant evacuation operation [NEO] or ensuring that military actions requiring the use of force do not harm innocent civilians).[32]

Does the result of interaction with religious PVOs justify the use of time and resources? Some could argue that the results of interacting with religious PVOs are

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[31] David S. Alberts, et alli, *Network Centric Warfare* (DOD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999), 58ff.
[32] Joint Pub 3-0, V-7ff.

negligible at best; time and resources are needed elsewhere.[33] Some religious PVOs may

refuse to cooperate with any activity associated with the military. Religious PVOs vary

in size, experience, administrative capability, and emphasis on proselytizing.

As stated earlier, effective planning with relief organizations commences well in

advance of an actual operation. Prior planning engenders familiarization with the diverse

capabilities of relief organizations, which redeems time by allowing planners to anticipate

the specific focus of energy for each relief organization.[34] Many religious PVOs already

maintain presence in developing countries. In some cases, religious PVOs have

established permanent arrangements in certain countries to cooperate when calamity

strikes. Rather than producing minimum results working alone, they optimize their

collective capability to supply food, clothing, and medicine.[35] Through capitalizing on

the time prior to humanitarian operations to glean lessons learned from PVOs, the Joint

Task Force optimizes its operational planning time and focuses on areas appropriate to its

objectives. Time and resources are not wasted gaining familiarity with religious PVOs

prior to operations and during operations. Time and resources spent in liaison avoid

duplication of effort, mismanagement of personnel and resources, and interagency

rivalries.[36]

Current doctrine furnishes a template for understanding religious PVOs: authority

and responsibilities, organizational structure, capabilities and core competencies, and

interagency relationships.[37] This template can serve as a tool to initiate dialogue with

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[33] Joint Pub 3-0, III-15f.

[34] Major Thomas F. Greco, Monograph: *Unity of Effort in Peace Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 10ff.

[35] Green, 39.

[36] Kenneth P. LaMon, *Training Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations* (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 1995), 14.

[37] Joint Pub 3-08, Annex P to Appendix B.

religious PVOs. The first step in establishing communication is to relay to religious PVOs that the military recognizes their vital contribution in disaster relief. Secondly, the military must understand that the operations of religious PVOs operate are dependent upon private donations. The Chaplain Corps is accustomed to the constraints imposed on the religious PVOs, as well as their capabilities. At the JTF level, the JTF Chaplain can monitor the progress of religious PVOs for the Joint Task Force Commander.

Does liaison with religious PVOs circumvent the command and control of the Joint Task Force Commander? Is the chaplain detached from the operational domain and therefore, excluded from operational planning? A narrow view of the Chaplain Corps confines the industry of the chaplain to the conduct of worship services and pastoral counseling. This argumentation falters upon examination of the training, operational employment, and joint-oriented focus of the Chaplain Corps.

Professional development for chaplains has included training in disaster relief. The training has combined pastoral care with familiarization in interagency coordination. For example, after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Chaplain Corps developed a curriculum for Critical Incident Stress Debriefing [CISD] in 1998. Although CISD indoctrination concentrated on stress debriefing for disaster victims, interagency cooperation was emphasized.[38]

The chaplains of I Marine Expeditionary Force conducted training on humanitarian assistance operations in 1998. The indoctrination included an extensive overview of Joint Task Force Operations, NGOs and PVOs (their missions, capabilities, levels of financial support, and geographical regions represented). The training evolution

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[38] U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps, Professional Development Training Course--FY 98, *Ministry in Trauma and Disaster.*

culminated in considering how the institutional capability of the Chaplain Corps could be utilized in a variety of HAOs.[39]

The CISD and HAO training sponsored by Chaplain Corps clearly indicate that chaplain professional development is relevant to the operational employment of military forces. The operational employment of chaplains underscores their breadth and depth of operational experience. Chaplains deploy worldwide with their units. They are gaining joint-oriented focus through deployments with JTFs in support of MOOTW (e.g., Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE). The training, operational employment, and joint-oriented focus of chaplains serve to enhance the JTF Commnader's C2 and do not detract from it.

DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE

Joint Pub 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*, seems to present the element of liaison with humanitarian relief organizations as a functional role of the JTF Chaplain:

> "Chaplains **conduct liaison with, and support humanitarian efforts** by working with, humanitarian relief agencies, civil affairs, and public affairs where appropriate. Their skill and experience in public relations allows them to bring an added dimension and perspective to the command's total mission."[40]

The doctrine, however, does not formalize the chaplain's conduct of liaison by incorporation into the organizational structure of the Joint Task Force. For the JTF Chaplain's liaison with religious PVOs to enhance unity of effort, it must be linked with operational planning. Joint Pub 1-05 is replete with references to the JTF Chaplain

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[39] Chaplain Training: "Religious Ministry Teams in Humanitarian Assistance Operations," Summer 1998. This training conference was based upon Joint Pub 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*, 26 August 1996.

coordinating, **"as required, with host-nation (HN) civil or military religious representatives;"**[41] chaplains work with "civil affairs personnel in analyzing local religious organizations;"[42] chaplains assist **"humanitarian agencies and civil affairs units** with humanitarian and disaster-relief programs;"[43] and they maintain **"liaison with national and international relief organizations** within the theater."[44] Without incorporation into the organizational structure, this coordinating activity remains isolated from operational planners.

Similarly, Joint Pub 1-05 omits direct guidance for the Chaplain Corps in communicating with relief organizations. Joint Pub 1-05 describes the relationship of the Chairman of the Armed Forces Chaplain Board to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. It does not make formal provision to coordinate effort with religious PVOs prior to humanitarian assistance operations.[45] As a result, the chaplain's advisory role diminishes in proactive relevance. This permeates the organizational structure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Task Force. Consequently, the designation of the JTF Chaplain as "a member of the special staff who reports directly to the combatant command's chief of staff,"[46] without further organizational appointment, does not enable the chaplain's input to be factored into the JTF's operational plans.

REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A survey of the Joint Pubs and available literature on coordinating a unity of effort with relief organizations suggests a consensus on the necessity for enhanced

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[40] Joint Pub 1-05, I-2.
[41] Ibid., I-3.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., II-5.
[44] Ibid., II-3.
[45] Ibid., II-2.
[46] Ibid.

communications. For communication to be effective it must originate from relationships predating real world operations. Enhanced communications facilitate unity of effort by exchanging information and clarification of capabilities. Lessons learned from previous humanitarian assistance operations emphasize two points:

1. The present composition of the civil-military operation center does not have the resident capability to ensure communication and coordination.

2. Religious PVOs and their critical capabilities tend to be overlooked by operational planners.

Persistent liaison prior to and during operations with NGOs and PVOs is absolutely essential to mission accomplishment.[47] The institutional capability of the Chaplain Corps and network centric communication offer the Joint Task Force Commander a partial solution to the problem of command and control. The JTF Commander, while not exercising command and control over relief organizations, may draw upon the expertise of the chaplain. The Chaplain Corps has relationships with many religious denominations. The proposal of this paper is to amend Joint doctrine as follows: designate the Armed Forces Chaplains Board as the principle liaison with religious PVOs prior to operations and assign the JTF Chaplain to the CMOC as the principle liaison with religious PVOs in the theater of operations. This proposal would capitalize on the relationship between the Chaplain Corps and religious PVOs prior to operations. The JTF Chaplain's assignment to the CMOC would ensure that the Chaplain's liaison with the religious PVOs is incorporated into operational planning. Amending Joint doctrine accordingly will accomplish the following: leverage the Chaplain Corps' knowledge of religious PVOs, validate the JTF Chaplain's function of liaison with religious PVOs in theater of operations, optimize the operational planning of

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the Joint Task Force, and enhance C2 for JTF Commander. Religious PVOs, by virtue of their participation in disaster relief, are potential sources of information to the JTF Commander. Religious PVOs and the military can benefit through cooperation in accomplishing the common goal of humanitarian assistance. The Chaplain Corps and the JTF Chaplain constitute the most efficient and effective means of ensuring a unity of effort with religious PVOs.

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[47]Greco, 43ff.

APPENDIX

Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War

Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort in every operation.

Security: Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

Legitimacy: Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisioins.[48]

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